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Money, Speech,  
and Chutzpah
J O E L  M .  G O R A
The author is a professor at Brooklyn Law School and formerly a longtime lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union.
As a young boy growing up in a working-class family in a mostly 
Jewish neighborhood of Los Angeles, I learned that the word 
“chutzpah” had two different and opposite meanings. The posi-
tive one was a synonym for courage or moxie or fearlessness, 
as in the chutzpah to take on established authority. Think of 
Lenny Bruce, the great comic scourge of the establishment or 
of the cases recounted in Alan Dershowitz’s book called, simply, 
Chutzpah. The other meaning has a negative connotation, as in 
gall or nerve or effrontery, or perhaps even duplicity. Think of 
the example of the defendant who murders his parents and then 
seeks the mercy of the court on the ground that he is an orphan.
In the decades-old battle over whether campaign finance 
limitations violate free speech principles, I think there has been 
a good deal of chutzpah of both kinds. In the interests of full 
disclosure, I should note that I have been involved in challeng-
ing campaign finance restrictions—on the ground they are fun-
damental violations of free speech principles—for most of my 
professional career, both as an American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) lawyer and as a Brooklyn Law School professor. So it 
will come as no surprise to hear that, in my view, those who 
champion limitations on campaign funding have a lot of nerve 
to insist that the way to improve democracy is by limiting free 
speech. Conversely, those hearty souls, fewer in number but no 
less passionate in purpose, who have challenged these restric-
tions have manifested the admirable form of chutzpah in the 
decades-long battles, ranging from the 1976 landmark decision 
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to the more recent contro-
versial ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010). That positive form of chutzpah says, “What 
part of ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech’ do you not understand?” It asks why we should trust, 
let alone defer to, the judgment of elected incumbent politicians 
who are writing rules governing their reelections and limiting 
the free speech of their challengers and their critics. From the 
beginning, the battle over campaign finance restrictions has pit-
ted the Davids of candidates, parties, and independent groups 
against the Goliaths of government who would pass laws making 
it a crime to spend money to criticize them, aided and abetted 
by major media allies and well-funded “reform” groups who 
support such laws. Talk about chutzpah. In my view, it took the 
bad kind of chutzpah for the people in power to pass those laws 
and the good kind for those who challenged them over the years.
The First Heroes
Take, for example, Randolph K. Phillips, Richard A. Falk, Robert 
J. Bobrick, Elizabeth A. Most, Alfred Hassler, Ron Young, and 
Ernest Gruening. They are the first heroes in the modern free 
speech war against campaign finance restrictions. They were a 
small band of left-wing activists convinced that then president 
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Richard Nixon had committed war crimes by his conduct of the 
war in southeast Asia. So they formed the National Committee 
for Impeachment. In the spring of 1972, they ponied up enough 
money to run a two-page ad in the New York Times detailing 
the allegations against the president and praising a handful 
of like-minded members of Congress who had sponsored an 
impeachment resolution against him. In a country with a First 
Amendment and a commitment to democracy, one would have 
thought that the people engaged in these activities would have 
received some kind of good citizenship award. Instead, they 
received a visit from agents of the U.S. government, which sued 
to shut the group down, claiming that the ad violated the brand-
new Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972 (FECA), the ink on 
which was not even dry. Why? Because it was an election year, 
and the ad might somehow affect people’s thinking about these 
issues and might thereby affect how they would vote in the 1972 
elections and thereby “influence the outcome” of the elections. 
And because the group had run the ad without seeking the per-
mission of the candidates the ad might help, as required by the 
brand-new law’s limits on media expenditures supporting or 
opposing candidates for federal office, not to mention failing 
to form a political committee, file reports, and disclose their 
contributors and supporters—even though they proudly affixed 
their names to the newspaper advertisement—they would have 
to cease their free speech until they complied with the new law. 
At first glance, it seemed hard to believe that a proceeding like 
this could be brought, given the strong protection of political 
speech that the liberal Warren Court had established. And this 
seemed the clearest example of protected political speech that 
the government could not prohibit, limit, or license.
The antiwar group leaders reached out to the ACLU to rep-
resent them in defending this case. When we began to review it, 
we were stunned that the government would bring it and at the 
provisions of the new law that authorized the attempt to silence 
these critics of government. These laws were sold as “reforming” 
our elections. By silencing criticism of government? Some reform 
that turned out to be. Happily, we were successful in defending 
the group by persuading the federal appeals court in New York 
to rule that the new campaign finance law was not intended to 
and should not be applied to issue-oriented speech that com-
mented on the critical questions of the day and appropriately 
criticized politicians in the course of doing so.
But as we learned more about the new FECA law in order 
to defend the impeachment group, the law’s overbreadth and 
vagueness became immediately apparent, as did its prior re-
straint mechanism. It effectively sought to control any money 
spent “for the purpose of influencing the . . . election . . . of any 
person to federal office,” which, in an election year, could extend 
to any money spent to criticize the incumbents running the gov-
ernment who were up for reelection. The ACLU, like countless 
other cause organizations, could find itself running afoul of the 
law for its criticism of the civil liberties stance of elected officials, 
despite the ACLU’s historic and absolute nonpartisan status.
The ACLU felt compelled to bring its own lawsuit against 
the new campaign finance law on the ground that it unconsti-
tutionally could suppress the group’s nonpartisan criticism of 
government and the politicians who run it. It was now the fall 
of that 1972 election year, and the ACLU wanted to criticize 
President Nixon’s opposition to busing to enforce school inte-
gration and support members of Congress who had opposed his 
position. But the threat of the law being applied to us stood in 
the way. We filed suit in the federal court in Washington, D.C., 
back in the day when you needed a three-judge federal court to 
consider the constitutionality of a federal statute. The three-
judge court scheduled a hearing for late on a Friday afternoon in 
October, and I remember taking the Metroliner to Washington, 
D.C., accompanying one of the ACLU’s senior counsel, Marvin 
Karpatkin, who would be representing us in that hearing. As 
the train neared the nation’s capital, we found ourselves mar-
veling at a legal system that would provide a fair judicial forum 
for a group of citizens to sue the government for violation of 
their fundamental First Amendment rights and demand that the 
government explain the reasons for such censorship. It seemed 
it would take a lot of, shall we say, chutzpah for us to do that. But 
our marvelous judicial system, with its independent judiciary, 
provided the mechanism that enabled us to do so. (Karpatkin 
certainly did not lack chutzpah. As a prominent litigator in mili-
tary draft cases, he argued before the Supreme Court challenging 
the conviction of an anti-war protester who burned his draft card 
in dissent against the war in Vietnam. Unfortunately, the Court 
ruled against him in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).)
The three-judge court was very responsive to our arguments 
that afternoon, and it felt as though the meaning and purpose 
of the First Amendment had come alive in that Washington, 
D.C., courtroom. The court granted the ACLU a preliminary 
injunction to run its issue advertisement criticizing or praising 
incumbent politicians during an election season and went on 
thereafter to hold that the law requiring permission to speak out 
about politicians was an impermissible prior restraint and one 
that could not be imposed on nonpartisan issue organizations.
After Watergate
Those two rulings would certainly have cleared the way for the 
ACLU and the myriad other cause organizations in America to 
continue to criticize politicians free from fear of restraint un-
der the campaign finance laws. But then came the Watergate 
scandals. Although only some matters involved campaign fi-
nance irregularities—misconduct that either was already illegal 
under existing law or occurred before effective disclosure of 
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contributions had been implemented—that served as the excuse 
for a massive expansion of the campaign finance controls. The 
new law, passed in the fall of 1974, was an across-the-board effort 
by the federal government to regulate political speech through 
limiting and controlling its funding. It set severe limits on po-
litical contributions and expenditures by candidates, parties, 
and independent groups; it imposed draconian new reporting 
and disclosure requirements designed to silence nonpartisan 
groups; and it set up a new agency to enforce this regime totally 
controlled by the incumbent politicians in the Congress and the 
White House. And this was all done in the name of reforming 
the political process. Talk about chutzpah.
Once again, a small group of outsiders had the courage to say, 
“No, this will not stand. This effort to control political speech 
as thoroughly as the condemned Alien and Sedition Laws of 
an earlier era will not go unchallenged.” Led by an odd cou-
ple of outsiders—James Buckley, the conservative U.S. Senator 
from New York, and the liberal, antiwar icon, Senator Eugene 
McCarthy of Minnesota—a strange bedfellows coalition of out-
siders came together to challenge the law. They included the New 
York Civil Liberties Union, headed by Ira Glasser, and a number 
of other liberal and conservative cause organizations and third-
party groups, including the Libertarian Party; the conservative 
magazine Human Rights; the Mississippi Republican Party; and 
Stewart Mott, a wealthy General Motors heir who had lavishly 
backed a number of left-wing causes. Taken as a whole, their 
complaint was that the new laws were systematic violations of 
the freedoms of speech, press, association, and petition safe-
guarded at the core of the First Amendment. At the same time, 
they were incumbent protection devices designed to preserve the 
power of the status quo and the entrenched political and media 
establishment, by denying outside voices the wherewithal to get 
their dissident messages out. (Oh, if we had only had Twitter 
back then.) Thus was the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo born.
The omnibus complaint against the new campaign finance 
law was first heard by the entire D.C. Circuit, in an exceptional 
en banc proceeding that was provided for in the new law in 
order to allow its immediate challenge. The suit was filed the 
first day the law went into effect. Our team was led by then Yale 
Law School professor Ralph K. Winter Jr., who would go on to 
an extremely distinguished career on the Second Circuit, and 
by Brice Clagett, a major litigating partner at the Washington 
powerhouse firm of Covington and Burling, ably assisted by 
John R. Bolton, then a young associate who would also go on to 
an extremely distinguished career in politics and public service. 
Except for the fact that we were working out of Covington’s 
fancy law firm offices, we felt like decided outsiders up against 
a legal, political, and media establishment that had vouched for 
the constitutionality and necessity of the law. David and Goliath 
once again. It did seem that we had a lot of nerve challenging 
what was heralded as such a solid gold law. And, indeed, the 
proceedings in the D.C. Circuit seemed to vindicate the law and 
its defenders, with a ruling that upheld every provision of the 
law except one—a section that would have required groups like 
the ACLU to disclose their members and contributors as the 
price of criticizing elected officials during an election year. It 
has always been a source of pride for me that I was responsible 
for arguing that part of the case, which provided the one bright 
spot of victory in the en banc court decision.
It was always clear that the case would go to the Supreme 
Court on an exceptionally fast track, and it did. Once again, we 
felt like long-shot underdogs, with so much of the Establishment 
on the other side of our challenge. During the argument at the 
Court—another exceptional moment, the whole day set aside for 
argument on the one case—luminaries like Senator Ted Kennedy 
and others who had championed the law were prominently seat-
ed in the first row of the distinguished guests section of the 
courtroom. But once the arguments began, and as we started 
hearing the kinds of skeptical questions many of the justices 
were directing at the lawyers defending the law—questions we 
had been raising from the beginning of the case and to little 
avail—we felt for the first time in the litigation that our argu-
ments were getting the fair hearing they deserved. Once again, it 
seemed the nerve of those enacting such a questionable law was 
being met by the courage of those with the chutzpah to challenge 
it. At the end of the day of oral argument, we had the feeling 
that, win or lose, for the first time the severe First Amendment 
concerns raised by the law were being taken seriously.
The Landmark Buckley Decision
As is well known, the Court’s landmark 1976 Buckley decision 
ruled decisively, for the first time, that limitations on the fund-
ing of political speech were limitations on that speech itself and 
subject to the most careful First Amendment scrutiny. Limits 
on spending failed that test, as did limits on issue advocacy 
by groups and individuals. Limits on giving to candidates and 
parties were upheld on the theory—mistaken in my view—that 
they were necessary to avoid corruption or the appearance of 
corruption, concerns that we challengers had argued could 
be addressed adequately and less drastically by disclosure of 
large contributions and enforcement of conflict-of-interest and 
bribery laws. But to those of us who a few years earlier, in the 
impeachment advertisement case, had strenuously insisted, 
when few others concurred, that limits on political funding 
were limits on political speech, the Court’s confirmation of 
that view was gratifying, as was the Court’s reaffirmation of 
core First Amendment principles. For the next 25 years, the 
Buckley framework would govern campaign finance laws and 
result in Court decisions tending to strike down provisions that 
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limited spending, while upholding those that limited giving to 
candidates and parties.
As we had predicted in our arguments to the Court in Buckley, 
any Solomon-like splitting of the decision would lead individu-
als and groups to use their resources to get out their message in 
ways not involving direct contributions to candidates or to ben-
efit candidates. The result was a lot of donations of “soft money” 
to political parties for their generic activities as well as spending 
of funds independently by corporations and labor unions for is-
sue advocacy that skirted direct endorsement of candidates but 
could have an impact on elections. To “close these loopholes,” 
Congress passed the McCain-Feingold bill, which outlawed any 
raising or spending of soft money by any political parties even 
to be used for things like get-out-the-vote campaigns. All cor-
rupting, said Congress. Even worse, the law made it a crime for 
any corporation—including all of the nonprofit cause organiza-
tions in America—or any labor union to spend any funds speak-
ing out, on broadcast or similar media, for or against politicians 
during an election season, or even mentioning their names. To 
make the First Amendment insult even greater, the corporate 
news media were specifically exempted from this statutory gag 
order. To paraphrase George Orwell, all groups are equal, but 
some groups are more equal than others. As the powerful dis-
sent of the late Justice Antonin Scalia would point out, it took 
an unusual amount of chutzpah for the Congress to pass this 
law, which was the ultimate incumbent protection measure. It 
censored the political parties—who most often support challeng-
ers to incumbents—and it censored those powerful independent 
groups—corporations, nonprofit organizations, and unions—who 
most frequently criticized incumbents. Not to mention that the 
First Amendment seems to say that Congress cannot do that: 
“Congress shall make no law,” and all that.
The law was challenged by another strange bedfellows coali-
tion, which had the American Federation of Labor–Congress of 
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) marching side by side with 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the ACLU joining forces 
with the National Rifle Association (NRA), all in opposition 
to this law that silenced all of them and the tens of millions of 
Americans they represent. They disagreed on so many policy 
matters, but they all agreed that the new law was a direct af-
front to the First Amendment. It was a coalition assembled under 
the leadership of Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, and it 
included, as one of the plaintiffs, the current vice president of 
the United States, Mike Pence, then a member of the House of 
Representatives. This was certainly not a small band of outsiders 
like the Buckley plaintiffs. Rather, it was key participants in the 
political process insisting that the law was designed to silence 
them and empower their political adversaries, who had been the 
ones who pushed the law through in the first place. During the 
argument, for which the Court once again set aside an entire day, 
the tenor of the questioning—especially some questions asked 
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist—led us at the challengers 
counsel table to feel that we might have a chance to eke out a 
narrow 5–4 victory striking down the law. Unfortunately, our 
celebrations were quite premature.
In its decision in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
540 U.S. 93 (2003), a decision with a rare joint co-authorship by 
both Justice John Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
the majority of the Court—its “liberal” justices—severely watered 
down the First Amendment’s protections of political speech 
and association in order to uphold the law as a way to deter not 
only corruption but also undue access and influence by those 
who financially support political parties or make independent 
expenditures speaking about politicians. The majority opinion 
was the absolute nadir of First Amendment jurisprudence in this 
area, giving the government extremely broad powers to regulate 
the funding of political speech and association—the most potent 
weapon the people have to challenge the government. Talk about 
chutzpah. The ruling was cheered by most of the major media, 
and why not? Now they would be the only major institutions 
with a free hand to use their resources to speak about politicians. 
Lucky for those who own a newspaper or a broadcast network.
Citizens United
Of course, the final chapter in our story is yet to come. That is 
the case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010), certainly the most widely known, though perhaps 
least understood, Supreme Court decision of modern times. For 
a landmark ruling, it didn’t start out that way. According to the 
head of the group, David N. Bossie, Citizens United, a conser-
vative political and cause organization, was not spoiling for a 
constitutional fight. Its chutzpah was not that it wanted to set a 
The 1974 law was an 
across-the-board effort by 
the federal government to 
regulate political speech 
through limiting and 
controlling its funding.
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landmark precedent or overturn a prior ruling. What it did want 
to do was emulate a liberal iconic storyteller, Michael Moore, 
whose 2004 film Fahrenheit 9/11 was a broadside attack against 
President George W. Bush, who was up for reelection that year. 
Citizens United wanted to do the same thing against Hillary 
Clinton, the front-runner for the Democratic Party presidential 
nomination in 2008.
The problem was that the law upheld in the McConnell case 
seemed to make it a crime and otherwise prevent the group 
from doing so because it was a corporation, albeit a nonprofit 
like hundreds of thousands of other cause organizations, but the 
law made no exception for that. Citizens United might be able 
to make the movie, but it could not advertise it on television or 
show it on demand. It was not even clear Citizens United could 
show the film in a movie theater because it politically attacked 
then senator Clinton. The group tried to see if there was any 
way the Federal Election Commission might approve or make 
an exception for the film, but there was not. So Citizens United 
really had not set out to bring a landmark case, but in order to 
get its movie and its message out, it had to challenge the cam-
paign finance law’s restrictions. When one steps back a moment, 
this whole situation should have been, as lawyers say, res ipsa 
loquitur. The idea that a group of citizens wanting to make and 
distribute a movie critical of a leading presidential candidate 
could not do so because the law would not allow that, or could 
not do so without seeking the permission or approval of a gov-
ernment agency, seems utterly unreal in a country with a First 
Amendment and, supposedly, a culture of free speech. How 
could such a classic example of free speech be made a crime?
Citizens United filed suit seeking a judicial declaration that it 
could produce and distribute the film Hillary: The Movie with-
out fear of enforcement of the federal campaign finance laws 
against it. There were a number of issues raised about whether 
nonprofit groups like Citizens United—and the countless coun-
terpart groups like the ACLU and others—could be restricted in 
this fashion. The issues would certainly be important for free 
speech and criticism of government generally. A lower court 
ruled against the group on the ground that the law covered the 
film and prevented its distribution.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court in March 2009 
and raised the expected issues. But at one pivotal point, Justice 
Samuel Alito asked the government’s lawyer whether, under the 
government’s theory of the First Amendment and the Court’s 
precedents, the law could be used to ban a publishing company 
from distributing a book critical of Senator Clinton? When the 
government’s lawyer answered “yes,” there was an audible gasp 
from members of the audience. Here was the government telling 
the Supreme Court that a book could be banned if it criticized a 
presidential candidate during an election year and was published 
by a corporation. It took nerve to give that answer, but it was con-
sistent with the government’s theory about the need to enforce 
the campaign finance laws. Many have speculated that, because 
of that answer to that question and the position it espoused, the 
Court decided to schedule the case for re-argument. In the re-
argument, Citizens United’s position would be supported by a 
Who’s Who of labor, business, civic, and political organizations 
across the political spectrum in America, including the ACLU, 
the AFL-CIO, the Chamber of Commerce, the NRA, and the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
That re-argument in September 2009 had great drama to it, 
with some of the top lawyers in the country, like Floyd Abrams, 
Ted Olson, then solicitor general Elena Kagan, and former solici-
tor general Seth Waxman, crossing swords. The same question 
about banning books was asked and answered, with a little more 
nuance. But the answer was basically the same: yes, the govern-
ment could ban a book published by a corporation in order to 
enforce the law. As the Court’s 5–4 ruling four months later in 
January 2010 would indicate, that seemed to be the straw that 
broke the back of the government’s theory. It resulted in the 
landmark ruling, written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, that 
independent speech about government and politics could not be 
banned or restricted because the speaker was an organization—
be it corporate, nonprofit, or labor—just as it could not be banned 
if it came from an individual. The free speech rights and benefits 
of the First Amendment had to be available equally to all. There 
could be no second-class speakers under our First Amendment; 
were the rule otherwise, the Court insisted, then the organized 
and established news media, almost all of which are corporate in 
form, could be restrained as well, which would be an intolerable 
consequence. Despite the fact that the Court explained that it 
It took the bad kind 
of chutzpah for the 
government full of 
incumbents to pass those 
incumbent-protecting, 
speech-suppressing 
laws in the first place.
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was protecting Citizens United in order to protect the New York 
Times, most of the major media greeted the decision with furi-
ous anger and contempt, not with open arms. But for those of us 
who had any role to play—however modest—in bringing about 
the Court’s decision and the free speech reasoning behind that 
ruling, it was a great day for the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, the ruling was met with an avalanche of protest 
and condemnation. It would lead to a corporate takeover of our 
government. It would be the death of democracy. And leading 
the charge was the president of the United States, who, in his 
State of the Union message a few days later, publicly attacked 
the decision, with the members of the Court sitting before him 
silently. I have never seen a president show such disrespect to 
the Supreme Court before. Talk about chutzpah. Of course, that 
would set the tone for the relentless media and partisan attacks 
on the decision that have not abated even now. During the recent 
presidential campaign, Secretary Clinton repeatedly promised—
to great applause each time—not to name anyone to the Supreme 
Court who was not prepared to overrule the decision. I thought 
litmus tests were improper for Supreme Court appointments and 
an undermining of the independence of the judiciary. Let alone 
the irony of a leading presidential candidate attacking a decision 
that permitted a group of citizens to question her fitness for the 
office. More chutzpah, for sure. One of our two major parties’ 
platforms contained a pledge to seek a constitutional amend-
ment, if necessary, to overrule the decision. The last time there 
was a serious effort to overrule a decision protecting free speech 
was against the Court’s ruling upholding the First Amendment 
right to burn the American flag as an expression of protest. That 
proposed amendment was defeated, and this one will be as well, 
and with good cause. We do not need a new First Amendment 
that repeals the current one. We just need to safeguard and apply 
the one we have, which has served America so well for 225 years.
One more recent example of the courage of one’s convictions 
in this area involves Shaun McCutcheon, a businessman from 
Alabama and dedicated Republican Party supporter. He wanted 
to give a number of contributions—each within the legal limit—
to Republican candidates and committees whose principles and 
policies he shared and supported. The federal campaign finance 
law contained a provision limiting the aggregate amount of such 
contributions that any one person could give during an election 
season, even though each individual one would be perfectly legal. 
The Supreme Court in Buckley had upheld such an aggregate 
limit as a way to prevent corruption. But the campaign finance 
statutes and regulations had changed since then, and there were 
a number of new protections and restrictions to address such 
concerns. Building on Citizens United’s questioning of campaign 
finance limits, McCutcheon filed suit to challenge the aggre-
gate contribution limits. In another 5–4 ruling, the Supreme 
Court agreed with him, declaring that his aggregate financial 
support—fully disclosed and each specific contribution within 
the law’s limits—was an example of core First Amendment activ-
ity no different than marching in a parade or handing out leaflets, 
and no less admirable under our constitutional protections of 
freedom of speech and association. His chutzpah in bringing 
and winning that case paid off as well.
Conclusion
So there it is: From a handful of left-wing antiwar protestors 
to an organization of right-wing conservatives to a Republican 
businessman, groups and individuals have had the nerve to stand 
up and challenge the right of the government to seek to silence 
their criticism of those who run the government. It took the 
bad kind of chutzpah for the government full of incumbents 
to pass those incumbent-protecting, speech-suppressing laws 
in the first place, given the meaning and purpose of the First 
Amendment, and it took the good kind of chutzpah for all of the 
people and groups who took the government to task for violat-
ing those principles.
In doing so, they were vindicating the brave words of three 
Supreme Court justices of an earlier era who certainly did not 
lack chutzpah. In a case in which the government tried to make 
it a crime for labor unions to speak out on candidates for office, 
Justice William O. Douglas, for himself and Justice Hugo Black 
and Chief Justice Earl Warren, put it this way:
Under our Constitution, it is We The People who are sovereign. 
The people have the final say. The legislators are their spokes-
men. The people determine through their votes the destiny 
of the nation. It is therefore important—vitally important—
that all channels of communication be open to them during 
every election, that no point of view be restrained or barred, 
and that the people have access to the views of every group 
in the community.
. . .
Some may think that one group or another should not express 
its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it 
advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of law-
less action. But these are not justifications for withholding 
First Amendment rights from any group—labor or corpo-
rate. . . . First Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all 
persons and groups in this country. They are not to be dis-
pensed or withheld merely because we or the Congress thinks 
the person or group is worthy or unworthy.
United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 593, 594 (1957) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). q
